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Abstract
A thorny problem in identifying the determinants of reservation wages and particularly
the role of continued joblessness in their evolution is the simultaneity issue. We deploy a nat-
ural control function approach to the problem that involves conditioning elapsed duration on
completed unemployment duration in the reservation wage equation. Our analysis conﬁrms
that the use of elapsed duration alone compounds two separate and opposing inﬂuences.
Only with the inclusion of completed duration is the negative eﬀect of continued joblessness
on reservation wages apparent. For its part, the completed duration coeﬃcient suggests that
higher reservation wages negatively inﬂuence the probability of exiting unemployment.
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11 Introduction
In job search theory, the reservation wage is the lowest oﬀered wage that an un-
employed individual searching the market is prepared to accept. The notion of
a reservation wage corresponds to the solution of a standard optimal stopping
rule problem. Familiarly, and in general, higher reservation wages decrease the
probability of reemployment and thus prolong the duration of unemployment.
The issue of whether the reservation wage is constant or declining over the spell
of joblessness is of interest from the perspectives of theory, empirics, and policy. At
the levelof theory, there is an important distinctionbetweenconstant and declining
reservation wages. For its part, the constant reservation wage model lends itself to
an accessible and parsimonious way of recouping the structural parameters of the
optimal job search model (Lancaster and Chesher, 1983). Recognition of declining
reservation wages, on the other hand, allows for a distinctly richer model and
one that critically exploits the feedback mechanism running from unemployment
duration to reservation wages (Kiefer and Neumann, 1979).
Empirically, the two models have very diﬀerent structural content. The simple
constant reservation wage model does not raise identiﬁcation problems because
the system of equations is triangular since by deﬁnition unemployment duration
does not aﬀect reservation wages. With declining reservation wages, however,
an endogeneity problem arises because of the simultaneity between reservation
wages and unemployment duration: that is to say, the reservation wage not only
inﬂuences joblessness but it is also aﬀected by unemployment duration.
Finally, from a policy perspective, reservation wages oﬀer policy-makers an
added margin of adjustment by allowing them to inﬂuence the shape of reservation
wages over time. Thus, unemployment insurance (UI) rules can be manipulated,
via changes in the replacement rate and/or maximum duration of entitlements, or
by substituting social help for UI beneﬁts proper, etc. In this way, policies have
implications for nonstationary reservation wages.
Previous studies have rarely investigated reservation wages directly. Where
2they have done so, the information in question has typically been collected as a
snapshot, cross-section in form (Jones, 1988; Prasad, 2003; Sestito and Viviano,
2008). Accordingly, those analysts seeking to examine the course of reservation
wages have used elapsed or incomplete unemployment duration as a regressor.
But this method necessarily raises an issue of endogeneity, in the presence of
which researchers have to had to rely on a somewhat fragile instrumental variables
approach.
However, if one has the good fortune to possess longitudinal data with repeated
observations on reservation wages, information on completed unemployment du-
ration can be used to great advantage; speciﬁcally, as an argument of the control
function used to construct a consistent estimator of the rate of decline in reserva-
tion wages. In short, being able to condition on completed duration enables one
to derive the impact of elapsed duration on reservation wages.
The intuition behind the trick used here is straightforward. A naive regres-
sion of reservation wages on elapsed unemployment duration is dogged by reverse
causality precisely because higher reservation wages will generate longer completed
durations (and, by implication, longer completed durations entail longer elapsed
durations). The trick is, then, to include both elapsed and completed duration
in the set of regressors. Interestingly, this technique shares commonalities with
the tenure-earnings literature, where better matches produce higher earnings and
longer lasting jobs, and where analogously information on completed job duration
is required to obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of current tenure on wages
(see Abraham and Farber, 1987).
The intention of the present treatment is simply to oﬀer a revealing illustration
of how to tackle endogeneity in an important contemporary applied economics
setting.
2 The estimation approach
Let W denote the reservation wage, Z a vector of observed exogenous variables
(individual and calendar eﬀects), U the elapsed duration of stay in the state of un-
3employment (backward recurrence time), and ǫ explanatory unobserved variables.
V will represent remaining duration of stay in the state of unemployment (for-
ward recurrence time), so that a complete unemployment spell will have duration
S = U + V .
We want to identify the partial eﬀect
∂E[W|Z,U]/∂U,
measuring the eﬀect of an increase in elapsed unemployment duration on the aver-
age reservation wage of individuals with observed attributes Z. A naive approach
would be to estimate
W = α
′Z + βU + ǫ.
The reverse causation arguments presented above suggest that U is endogenous in
the sense that E[ǫ|Z,U] = E[ǫ|U]  = 0. Therefore, the coeﬃcient β will not capture
the desired partial eﬀect of U.
A simple way of formalizing the endogeneity of the elapsed duration it to assume
the extra equation
U = γ
′Z + δV + ω
and the restrictions
E[ω|Z,V] = 0 and E[ǫ|Z,V,ω] = E[ǫ|ω]  = 0.
(See Heckman and Robb, 1985; Newey, Powell, and Vella, 1999; Matzkin, 2004.)
In this model, the parameter of interest becomes,
∂E[W|Z,U]/∂U = β + ∂E[ǫ|ω]/∂U.
Some remarks are in order.
1. The ﬁrst moment restriction states the exogeneity of Z and V for U and the
second establishes that the correlation between W and U rests on unobserv-
ables.
42. The second equation together with the moment restrictions characterizes the
endogeneity of U for W. As explained in the introduction, for given U, higher
reservation wages induce higher continuing durations (an implication of basic
job search theory) which, being correlated with elapsed durations, establish
the reverse causation mechanism.
3. U and V are, in general, statistically dependent (Lancaster, 1990, 94). The
correlation between these variables is typically positive, for exactly the same
reasons that hazard functions of unemployment usually exhibit negative dura-
tion dependence: due to neglected heterogeneity individuals with long elapsed
durations tend to have longer complete unemployment spells. The exception
occurs when the unemployment duration distribution of the ﬂow of entrants
into unemployment is exponential (conditional on Z). Then δ = 0.
4. If E[ǫ|ω]  = 0, the OLS estimation of the reservation wage equation yields an
inconsistent estimator of β (even if δ = 0).
Now suppose that, as suggested in the introduction, we also condition on S,
the complete duration, (or, equivalently, on V )
E[W|Z,U,V] = α
′Z + βU + E[ǫ|ω]
= α
′Z + βU + CF(ω)
= α
′Z + βU + CF(U − γ
′Z − δV )
for some function CF( ), the so-called control function (Heckman and Robb, 1985).
Assume, for simplicity and illustrative purposes, that CF( ) is linear (as would
be the case if (ǫ,ω) were jointly normally distributed), that is CF(ω) = λω, we
may write (substituting V = S − U),
E[W|Z,U,V] = α
′Z + βU + λ(U − γ
′Z − δ(S − U))
= ˜ α
′Z + ˜ βU + ˜ δS,
where the ˜ ( ) denotes obvious transformations of the original parameters. This
regression can be estimated by OLS. The partial eﬀect of elapsed duration on the
5reservation wage is given by ˜ β = β+λ(1+δ). 1 Of course, assuming a linear control
function is unduly restrictive. A standard RESET test may be used to gauge the
signiﬁcance of this misspeciﬁcation. A more general alternative will entail some
form of power-series approximation to the control function.
3 Data
Our data are taken from the ﬁrst six waves of the European Community House-
hold Panel (EHCP), 1994-99. The ECHP is a survey based on a standardized
questionnaire administered annually to a representative panel of households and
individuals in 15 EU member states and oﬀers detailed information on the respon-
dent’s labor market experience, inter al. (see EUROSTAT, 1999). We used data
for 13 of the countries, excluding Luxembourg and Sweden, where it is not possible
to follow individuals through time.2
The key pieces of information taken from the survey are reservation wages
and elapsed duration. In the EHCP each individual actively looking for work is
asked two questions pertaining ﬁrst to desired hours of work and second to the
minimum income required to work these hours. The actual questions asked are
these: Assuming you could ﬁnd regular work, how many hours would you prefer to
work in this new job? and What is the minimum net monthly income you would
accept to work [these number of] hours a week in this new job? We construct an
hourly net reservation wage, computed as the ratio of desired net monthly income
to the optimal number of hours. This variable is deﬂated by the respective national
consumer price index.
The other crucial variables are the duration of the current unemployment spell
and its ultimate duration. The ECHP sampling procedure considers only jobless
spells of individuals with previous work experience for whom we are able to identify
1A simple (but rather telling) alternative speciﬁcation, and one that avoids by construction the endogeneity
of unemployment duration, would be to use the ratio between elapsed and completed unemployment duration as
a regressor. Estimation of this model generated a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the ratio
variable.
2The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
6the onset of unemployment by month and year. Given that, with one exception,
we know the month and year of the interview we compute elapsed duration as
the period from the point of job loss up to the interview. (That one exception
is Germany, for which country we assume that all the interviews were conducted
in October.) As far as completed duration is concerned, since we can follow the
individual between surveys up to the point of reemployment,we can simply add the
residual calendar months spent unemployed in the subsequent interval to compute
elapsed duration.
In the present exercise, we were interestedin using most the parsimonious model
consistent with a declining reservation wages. Accordingly, the RHS arguments
additional to elapsed and completed duration were limited simply to a gender
dummy, three schooling dummies, four age dummies, ﬁve time dummies, and
thirteen country dummies. We also deployed a continuous measure of the overall
unemployment rate at the time of the survey.3
4 Findings
Summary results of ﬁtting the reservation model separately for elapsed duration
and completed duration are givenin the ﬁrst two columns of Table 1. The elasticity
of reservation wages with respect to elapsed duration is negative but statistically
insigniﬁcant at conventional levels. The point estimate is tiny, suggesting that a
1 percent increase in the duration of an ongoing spell is associated with a 0.002
percent decrease in reservation wages. For its part, the elasticity of the reservation
wage with respect to completed duration is positive but again small in magnitude
(0.004) and statistically insigniﬁcant as well.
However, as is apparent from the penultimate column of the table, when both
duration variables are included in the reservation wage equation, each is statis-
tically signiﬁcant. And indeed each elasticity is sharply higher: -.015 and .024,
respectively. Conditioning on completed duration, then, there is every indication
3We also experimented using a variable identifying the order of distinct unemployment spells as well as the
receipt (or otherwise) of unemployment insurance beneﬁts. In neither case, however, were the results reported
below disturbed by their inclusion.
7of a small but nontrivial and well-determined decline in reservation wages over the
course of joblessness. The positive association between completed duration and
reservation wages is of course indicative of the reverse line of causation running
from reservation wages to jobless duration.
As noted above, the speciﬁcations in Table 1 include 13 country dummies. If,
however, country heterogeneity may be expected to assist in the identiﬁcation of
the impact of unemployment duration on reservation wages, we might usefully drop
the country dummies. In the ﬁnal column of the table, therefore, we provide results
for the correct speciﬁcation, including both duration measures but omitting the
country ﬁxed eﬀects. Compared with the results in the preceding column, it can
be seen that the point estimates for the duration measures strengthen in absolute
magnitude.
Speciﬁcation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
U -0.002 -0.015 -0.025
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
S 0.004 0.024 0.070
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes No
R2 0.418 0.418 0.419 0.166
number of observations 10003 10003 10003 10003
Table 1: The Determinants of Reservation Wages. Robust Standard Errors in paren-
thesis. The regressions also include a continuous unemployment rate variable, a gender
dummy, 3 Schooling, 4 age, and 5 year dummies.
As a robustness check, we re-ran the preferred reservation wage equation by
gender, with and without country dummies. The summary results are given in
Table 2. We see that, conditioning on completed duration, reservation wages are
decreasing in ongoing joblessness for both males and females. The results are
however stronger, in terms of both absolute magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance
for males, as indeed is the reverse line of causation running from reservation wage
to unemployment duration. On this occasion, however, removing the country
8dummies yielded almost identical point estimates by gender.
Variable Males Females
U -0.020 -0.025 -0.009 -0.024
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
S 0.031 0.071 0.016 0.071
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
Country dummies Yes No Yes No
R2 0.371 0.154 0.468 0.155
number of observations 5181 5181 4822 4822
Table 2: The Determinants of Reservation Wages by Gender. Robust Standard Er-
rors in parenthesis. The regressions also include a continuous unemployment rate vari-
able, a gender dummy, 3 Schooling, 4 age, and 5 year dummies.
5 Conclusions
The fact that reservation wages and unemployment duration are simultaneously
determined has preoccupied analysts in this area and arguably would have proven
more disruptive had direct information on reservation wages been more readily
available. In the present treatment, we have been able to exploit such information
to demonstrate how the true eﬀect of the unemployment experience on reservation
wages can be modeled. The approach which is to condition elapsed duration on
completed duration is analogous to that used by Abraham and Farber (1987) in
addressing the bias attaching to the pro-productive tenure argument in the aug-
mented Mincerian earnings function, which we have formally approached as an
omitted variables problem. We have shown that reservation wages are declining
over the course of the unemployment or jobless spell. While rejecting the as-
sumption of stationary reservation wages, we note that the elasticity/elasticities
of reservation wage with respect to elapsed duration are rather small and, further,
that there is well-determined direct association between completed duration and
reservation wages which is to be construed as higher reservation wages lead to
higher jobless duration. By failing to control for completed jobless duration we
9conﬂate the two opposing eﬀects.
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